POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES
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Publication:5212484
Recommendations
- Corrections to “Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives” (International Economic Review60 (2019), 1489–1504)
- A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- Collective choice rules with social maximality
- An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
- The majority stochastic preference rule for group decision making
- Choice by multirelations and the approval voting rule
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
Cited in
(12)- The majority decision function for trees with 3 leaves
- A spatial analogue of May's theorem
- Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules
- Decisive coalitions and positive responsiveness
- Some characterizations of resolute majority rules
- May's theorem in an infinite setting
- An extension and an alternative characterization of May's theorem
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- Is the preference of the majority representative?
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice
- An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
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