On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
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Publication:2318132
DOI10.1007/s10058-018-0210-7zbMath1422.91179OpenAlexW2805049679MaRDI QIDQ2318132
Publication date: 13 August 2019
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0210-7
Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Linguistics (91F20)
Related Items (3)
Unnamed Item ⋮ Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power
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