Manipulation and the Pareto rule

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90053-XzbMath0427.90006MaRDI QIDQ1136592

Allan M. Feldman

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social choice; Pareto rule; nonmanipulability; preference analysis; voting procedure; manipulable rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule, Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule, Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings, Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems, Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities, On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules, Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules, The Pareto rule and strategic voting, Strategy-proof social choice correspondences., Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures, On the manipulation of social choice correspondences, A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions, Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences

Cites Work

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