scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738

zbMATH Open0537.90001MaRDI QIDQ3323629FDOQ3323629

Authors: Steven J. Brams, Peter Fishburn 

Publication date: 1983

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

Recommendations

• Approval voting
• Characterizing approval voting
• Approval Voting in Large Electorates
• Approval voting reconsidered
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Weighted approval voting
• Approval voting in subset elections
• A simple characterization of approval voting
• Approval voting without ballot restrictions
• Voting systems that combine approval and preference

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssimulationplurality votingstrategy-proofnessapproval votingpollingrunoffempirical examplesmulticandidate electionconstitutional law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• Social Choice Theory
• Reduction in problem size for ranking alternatives in group decision- making
• A nail-biting election
• Assessing the level of compromise in real choice models
• Choice from a three-element set: Some lessons of the 2000 presidential campaign in the United States
• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
• Adopting a Plurality Vote Perspective
• Voting procedures, complexity of
• Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
• Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments
• The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes
• Probabilistic preferences and topset voting
• Piercing numbers in approval voting
• Voces populi and the art of listening
• Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
• Signed orders and power set extensions
• Focusing on Campaigns
• Balancedness of social choice correspondences
• Strategic voting and nomination
• Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
• Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
• Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
• Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
• Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
• A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
• Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
• Bargaining through approval
• Some remarks on the concept of proportionality
• Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
• Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
• Making statements and approval voting
• Conformity in voting
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• VOTE: Computer evaluation of voting techniques and candidate's chances
• When does approval voting make the ``right choices?
• Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
• Stochastic precedence and minima among dependent variables
• Majority judgment vs. approval voting
• Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
• Knapsack cost sharing
• The senatorial election in spain. Proportional Borda methods for selecting several candidates
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Implementation via approval mechanisms
• A correspondence between voting procedures and stochastic orderings
• Aggregating imprecise linguistic expressions
• Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators
• Cognitive properties of approval voting. An experimental approach
• Structured preferences: a literature survey
• Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections
• Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences
• Voting method based on an average gap assessment
• Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
• Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
• The mathematical psychology of Peter Fishburn
• Recognition of relations by the method of collective vote
• Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting
• Describing society through approval data
• Statement voting
• Approval Voting in Product Societies
• Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
• Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Primarily about primaries
• VMAVA+: (VOTING METHOD BASED ON APPROVAL VOTING AND ARITHMETIC MEAN)+
• Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules
• Approval voting and positional voting methods: inference, relationship, examples
• Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
• Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Voting rules as statistical estimators
• Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
• A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Elections by means of approval voting. Phragmen's method and some variants of it
• Approval Voting in Large Electorates
• The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Characterizing approval voting
• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
• A live experiment on approval voting
• Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
• The median rule in judgement aggregation
• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements
• Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules
• Coalition voting
• Manipulability of choice aggregations
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• Committee selection under weight constraints
• Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections
• Handbook on approval voting
• On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
• Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
• On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
• Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
• Weight voting systems and the method of multirelations

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