scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738
The most common voting procedure used in multicandidate election when only one candidate must be selected is plurality rule or plurality rule with a runoff (a classical example of the plurality rule with a runoff is probably the French presidential election). Each voter is restricted to vote for just one candidate. Another process is the single transferable vote. It allows voters to rank the candidates from best to worst. If no candidate receives a majority of firstplace votes, the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is dropped and the second-place votes of his supporters are given to the remaining candidates. The elimination process may coninue until a candidate is selected. Approval voting is a new voting system which allows a voter to vote for (approve of) as many candidates as he wishes, the candidate with the most votes being elected. This book is devoted to a rather extensive analysis of Approval Voting (the authors have done more then any other people to make this procedure known and to show the nice properties it may have; in this sense, they are the discoverers of the procedure, even if they acknowledge that ``five sets of people hit upon the idea of approval voting independently and deserve credit for recognizing its potential). Chapter 1 is an overview and may be read without difficulties even by nonmathematically inclined laymen. - In Chapter 2, the formal framework is introduced and the authors show that approval voting is more strategy- proof than other non-ranked voting systems. Then, the authors consider four non-ranked voting systems - ordinary approval voting, ordinary plurality voting, approval voting with a runoff and plurality voting with a runoff. In case Condorcet winners exist (that is candidates who are preferred by a majority of voters to every other candidate in pairwise contests), they show that the ability of the different systems to guarantee the election of Condorcet candidates decreases in going from ordinary to runoff systems and from approval voting to plurality voting. But they note specific difficulties concerning sincerety. Chapter 4 is devoted to a simulation. The authors use ballot data from the 1976 Majority Leader of the United States House of Representatives election to reconstruct plausible preference orders for voters. Then, they examine the aforementioned four voting systems. According to their analysis, runoff plurality voting and ordinary approval voting are the two best systems, each having advantages and defects. - The fairness to voters question is addressed in Chapter 5. Does approval voting treat voters equitably? Does a voter's ability to affect the outcome of an approval voting election depend on the number of the candidates he votes for? The authors ``conclude that the voter, in being able to exercise power more effectively under approval voting because of the greater number of options available to him, is also treated more fairly under this system than under plurality voting. - Chapter 6 is an exercise in data analysis. When we start from vote totals for each candidate, we may want to know whether the winner is a Condorcet winner. The authors give conditions (deterministic as well as probabilistic) under which one can arrive at this conclusion. - Information given by polls is treated in the following chapter. Such polls may induce voters to react strategically. They find out that the effects of polling are clear under plurality voting: ``the Condorcet candidate is helped if he is one of the top two candidates in the poll. However, polling effects may not be salutary: they may undermine the Condorcet candidate under both plurality voting and approval voting. - Chapter 8 gives empirical examples (1980 New York Senate race, 1980 US presidential election and theoretical extensions - the Nash equilibrium concept of game theory is considered.) - In the last chapter the authors present again a case study of the 1980 presidential election and their findings are particularly interesting. They show that John Anderson had an electoral strength without any common measure with his 7 percent popular vote showing in the election. Though some parts of the book are technical, theorems are only stated and the reader is referred to articles in different journals for the proofs. Furthermore, all the formal parts are followed by examples and careful explanations. I think that the book can be read with profit by anyone having a secondary education. It should also be a compulsory reading for politicians and specialists in politics (particularly in constitutional law). I hope that this masterpiece of exposition will be translated into French so that approval voting may permeate through the French political life.
- Approval voting
- Characterizing approval voting
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates
- Approval voting reconsidered
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Weighted approval voting
- Approval voting in subset elections
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- Approval voting without ballot restrictions
- Voting systems that combine approval and preference
- On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
- Reduction in problem size for ranking alternatives in group decision- making
- Characterizing approval voting
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Approaches to collective decision making with fuzzy preference relations
- Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
- Signed orders and power set extensions
- Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
- Coalition voting
- Manipulability of choice aggregations
- Yes-no voting
- A shortcut method of calculating the distribution of election outcome types under approval voting
- Probabilistic preferences and topset voting
- Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- VOTE: Computer evaluation of voting techniques and candidate's chances
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- An approval-voting polytope for linear orders
- Assessing the level of compromise in real choice models
- Choice from a three-element set: Some lessons of the 2000 presidential campaign in the United States
- Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
- Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
- Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
- Binary choice, subset choice, random utility, and ranking: a unified perspective using the permutahedron
- Approval voting and positional voting methods: inference, relationship, examples
- Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
- On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
- Approval voting in subset elections
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes
- The median rule in judgement aggregation
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
- Majority judgment vs. majority rule
- Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules
- A correspondence between voting procedures and stochastic orderings
- Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
- Stochastic precedence and minima among dependent variables
- Strategic voting and nomination
- Knapsack cost sharing
- Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules
- Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Balancedness of social choice correspondences
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- A nail-biting election
- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- A live experiment on approval voting
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- A random utility model for approval voting
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
- Approval voting reconsidered
- Conformity in voting
- Statement voting
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
- Elections by means of approval voting. Phragmen's method and some variants of it
- Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates
- On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
- Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting
- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
- Describing society through approval data
- Possible winners in approval voting
- Recognition of relations by the method of collective vote
- When does approval voting make the ``right choices?
- A participatory budget model under uncertainty
- The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
- Focusing on Campaigns
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- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Approval voting
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- Voting systems that combine approval and preference
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- Variable-population voting rules
- Handbook on approval voting
- A general scoring rule
- Committee selection under weight constraints
- Aggregating imprecise linguistic expressions
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