scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738

zbMATH Open0537.90001MaRDI QIDQ3323629FDOQ3323629

Authors: Steven J. Brams, Peter Fishburn

Publication date: 1983

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Approval voting
Characterizing approval voting
Approval Voting in Large Electorates
Approval voting reconsidered
Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
Weighted approval voting
Approval voting in subset elections
A simple characterization of approval voting
Approval voting without ballot restrictions
Voting systems that combine approval and preference

fairness simulation plurality voting strategy-proofness approval voting polling runoff empirical examples multicandidate election constitutional law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Approval voting and positional voting methods: inference, relationship, examples
Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
The strategic sincerity of approval voting
Voting rules as statistical estimators
Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
Elections by means of approval voting. Phragmen's method and some variants of it
Approval Voting in Large Electorates
The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
Characterizing approval voting
Manipulation and the Pareto rule
A live experiment on approval voting
Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
The median rule in judgement aggregation
The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
Majority judgment vs. majority rule
Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements
Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules
Coalition voting
Manipulability of choice aggregations
Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
Committee selection under weight constraints
Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections
Handbook on approval voting
On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
Weight voting systems and the method of multirelations
Logic based merging
A participatory budget model under uncertainty
The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
On measures of cohesiveness under dichotomous opinions: some characterizations of approval consensus measures
An approval-voting polytope for linear orders
Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
Approval elections with a variable number of winners
Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
Approval voting reconsidered
Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
Consensus reaching in committees
On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
Yes-no voting
Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
Approval voting with endogenous candidates
Approval voting: three examples
Decision framing in judgment aggregation
Voting systems that combine approval and preference
Approval voting
Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
Weighted approval voting
Rank-based modelling of preferences in multi-criteria decision making
The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
Binary choice, subset choice, random utility, and ranking: a unified perspective using the permutahedron
Possible winners in approval voting
Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
Complexity and the geometry of voting
Evaluating competing theories via a common language of qualitative verdicts
Approval voting in subset elections
Variable-population voting rules
On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
A general scoring rule
On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
Approaches to collective decision making with fuzzy preference relations
Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections
Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences
Voting method based on an average gap assessment
Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
The mathematical psychology of Peter Fishburn
Recognition of relations by the method of collective vote
Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting
Describing society through approval data
Statement voting
Approval Voting in Product Societies
Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Primarily about primaries
VMAVA+: (VOTING METHOD BASED ON APPROVAL VOTING AND ARITHMETIC MEAN)+
Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules
Social Choice Theory
Reduction in problem size for ranking alternatives in group decision- making
A nail-biting election
Assessing the level of compromise in real choice models
Choice from a three-element set: Some lessons of the 2000 presidential campaign in the United States
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
Adopting a Plurality Vote Perspective
Voting procedures, complexity of

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