Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0589-3MaRDI QIDQ2452140zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard F. Potthoff

Publication date 30 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0589-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Approval voting
• Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference, and applications.
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Prediction markets, Bayesian priors, and clinical trials

Cited in

(3)

• A universal voting system based on the potential method
• Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
• Book review of: G. G. Szpiro, Numbers rule. The vexing mathematics of democracy, from Plato to the present

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