Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0589-3zbMATH Open1287.91052OpenAlexW2076045560MaRDI QIDQ2452140FDOQ2452140

Richard F. Potthoff

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0589-3

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Prediction markets, Bayesian priors, and clinical trials

Cited In (3)

• Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
• A universal voting system based on the potential method
• Book review of: G. G. Szpiro, Numbers rule. The vexing mathematics of democracy, from Plato to the present

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