Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections
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Publication:2452140
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0589-3zbMath1287.91052OpenAlexW2076045560MaRDI QIDQ2452140
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0589-3
Related Items (2)
Book review of: G. G. Szpiro, Numbers rule. The vexing mathematics of democracy, from Plato to the present ⋮ Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
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