scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5877224

Publication date: 12 April 2011

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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