Judge: Don't Vote!
DOI10.1287/OPRE.2014.1269zbMATH Open1307.91067OpenAlexW2115234499WikidataQ60174229 ScholiaQ60174229MaRDI QIDQ2935294FDOQ2935294
Publication date: 22 December 2014
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1269
faithful representationstrategic manipulationCondorcet and Arrow paradoxesfigure skatingjury decisionmeaningful measurementmethods of electing and rankingpresidential elections
History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
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- Social choice and individual values
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Cited In (13)
- On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules
- Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
- Accounting for political opinions, power, and influence: a voting advice application
- Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment
- Reasonable elections don’t exist!
- Majority judgment vs. majority rule
- Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting
- An extension of majority judgment to non-uniform qualitative scales
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
- On weakly and strongly popular rankings
- Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
- Majority judgment over a convex candidate space
- Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization
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