Judge: Don't Vote!

DOI10.1287/opre.2014.1269zbMath1307.91067OpenAlexW2115234499WikidataQ60174229 ScholiaQ60174229MaRDI QIDQ2935294

Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki

Publication date: 22 December 2014

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1269

zbMATH Keywords

faithful representationstrategic manipulationCondorcet and Arrow paradoxesfigure skatingjury decisionmeaningful measurementmethods of electing and rankingpresidential elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules ⋮ An extension of majority judgment to non-uniform qualitative scales ⋮ Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations ⋮ Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias ⋮ Majority judgment vs. majority rule ⋮ Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting ⋮ On weakly and strongly popular rankings ⋮ Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment ⋮ Accounting for political opinions, power, and influence: a voting advice application ⋮ Majority judgment over a convex candidate space ⋮ Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes ⋮ Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization

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• Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking

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