Judge: Don't vote!
DOI10.1287/OPRE.2014.1269zbMATH Open1307.91067OpenAlexW2115234499WikidataQ60174229 ScholiaQ60174229MaRDI QIDQ2935294FDOQ2935294
Authors: Rida Laraki, Michel Balinski 
Publication date: 22 December 2014
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1269
Recommendations
faithful representationstrategic manipulationCondorcet and Arrow paradoxesfigure skatingjury decisionmeaningful measurementmethods of electing and rankingpresidential elections
History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
- Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
- Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
- Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
Cited In (15)
- On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules
- Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
- Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
- Accounting for political opinions, power, and influence: a voting advice application
- Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment
- Reasonable elections don’t exist!
- Majority judgment vs. majority rule
- An extension of majority judgment to non-uniform qualitative scales
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
- On weakly and strongly popular rankings
- Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
- Majority judgment over a convex candidate space
- Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization
- Majority judgment vs. approval voting
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