Judge: Don't vote!

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2014.1269MaRDI QIDQ2935294zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Rida Laraki, Michel Balinski

Publication date 22 December 2014

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1269

zbMATH Keywords

faithful representationstrategic manipulationCondorcet and Arrow paradoxesfigure skatingjury decisionmeaningful measurementmethods of electing and rankingpresidential elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3366923 (Why is no real title available?)
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
• Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness

Cited in

(15)

• On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules
• Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
• Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
• Accounting for political opinions, power, and influence: a voting advice application
• Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment
• Reasonable elections don’t exist!
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• An extension of majority judgment to non-uniform qualitative scales
• A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
• Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
• On weakly and strongly popular rankings
• Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
• Majority judgment over a convex candidate space
• Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization
• Majority judgment vs. approval voting

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