Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.02.002MaRDI QIDQ323149zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mozart B. C. Menezes, Giovani J. C. da Silveira, Zvi Drezner

Publication date 7 October 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

votingapproval votingCondorcetmaximum coverage problemmedian problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
• Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
• Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
• A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
• Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
• The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
• Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1803754 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(5)

• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• The wisdom of voters: evaluating the Weber objective in the plane at the Condorcet solution
• Firm response to ethically motivated boycotts
• Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem
• The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• SPSS

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