Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
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Publication:323149
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.02.002zbMATH Open1346.91073OpenAlexW2269163318MaRDI QIDQ323149FDOQ323149
Authors: Mozart B. C. Menezes, Giovani J. C. da Silveira, Zvi Drezner 
Publication date: 7 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.002
Recommendations
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
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- Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
- The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
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Cited In (4)
- Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
- Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem
- The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
- Firm response to ethically motivated boycotts
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