Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
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Publication:323149
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.002zbMath1346.91073OpenAlexW2269163318MaRDI QIDQ323149
Mozart B. C. Menezes, Giovani J. C. da Silveira, Zvi Drezner
Publication date: 7 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.002
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Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ Firm response to ethically motivated boycotts
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Cites Work
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