An empirical analysis of valence in electoral competition
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Publication:647560
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0495-0zbMATH Open1235.91057OpenAlexW2116289405MaRDI QIDQ647560FDOQ647560
Authors: Fabian Gouret, Guillaume Hollard, Stéphane Rossignol 
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00867711/file/empirical-valence.pdf
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Cites Work
- The Lagrange Multiplier Test and its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics
- Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Elections with platform and valence competition
- Candidate ability and platform choice
Cited In (10)
- Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection
- Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
- Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
- Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
- Valence, complementarities, and political polarization
- Intensity valence
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
- Xenophobia and the size of the public sector in france: A politico-economic analysis
- Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich-McKelvey scaling
- Evaluating dimensionality in spatial voting models
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