Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00659-3MaRDI QIDQ2329410zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 17 October 2019

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00659-3

zbMATH Keywords

candidatesdistribution of ideal pointselectoral equilibriumelectoral gamerank objectivesvalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
• Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules
• Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
• Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
• On the existence of a fixed-number equilibrium in a multiparty electoral system
• On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
• Political competition between differentiated candidates
• Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry

Cited in

(8)

• Valence, complementarities, and political polarization
• Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich-McKelvey scaling
• Intensity valence
• Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
• Competence and ideology
• An empirical analysis of valence in electoral competition
• Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
• Elections with platform and valence competition

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