Connecting pairwise and positional election outcomes

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.02.002MaRDI QIDQ2637847zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald G. Saari, Tomas J. McIntee

Publication date 14 February 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.02.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes. Social choice analysis
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1897331 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules

Cited in

(9)

• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
• Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
• Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities
• On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies
• Adopting a Plurality Vote Perspective
• Another perspective on Borda's paradox
• Relationship admitting families of candidates
• Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting

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