Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0359-ZMaRDI QIDQ839624zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christopher R. H. Hanusa

Publication date 2 September 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0359-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• Connecting pairwise and positional election outcomes
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
• Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency

Cites work

• Basic Geometry of Voting
• How many voters are needed for paradoxes?
• Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
• Millions of election outcomes from a single profile

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