Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3641150 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Note on Preference Aggregation
- A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Mathematical Derivation of an Election System
- On the sum-of-ranks winner when losers are removed
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Social Choice and Individual Ranking I
- Social Choice and Individual Rankings II
- Some inconsistencies in judging problems
Cited in
(14)- On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
- Construction of voting situations concordant with ranking patterns
- Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting
- The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems
- Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
- Chaos, but in voting and apportionments?
- Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
- Dictionaries
- Construction of aggregation paradoxes through load-sharing models
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
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