Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
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Publication:755417
DOI10.1007/BF01442897zbMATH Open0417.90017MaRDI QIDQ755417FDOQ755417
Peter Fishburn, William V. Gehrlein
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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Cited In (10)
- Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities
- Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
- The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner
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