Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4124542

DOI10.2307/1913287zbMath0353.90001OpenAlexW2039760542MaRDI QIDQ4124542

Amartya Sen

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913287



Related Items

Voting operators in the space of choice functions, A majority-rule characterization with multiple extensions, A note on Fung-Fu's theorem, Foundational belief change, Expert knowledge and computer-aided group decision making: Some pragmatic reflections, Choosing from a tournament, Social choice in economic environments with dimensional variation, On the relative strengths of consistency conditions on choice functions, Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm, Cosine similarity and the Borda rule, Defining the Borda count in a linguistic decision making context, Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules, Approval voting on dichotomous preferences, Consistency indicators for fuzzy choice functions, Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution, Path independence in serial-parallel data processing, Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle, The impossibility of a weakly path independent Paretian liberal, Three practical criteria of comparison among ordinal preference aggregating rules, Optimization and external reference; a comparison of three axiomatic systems, A note on rationality conditions of fuzzy choice functions, Sets of probability distributions, independence, and convexity, Institutions and their ethical evaluation, The rationalizability of two-step choices, Lexicographic choice functions, Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem, On the routewise application of choice, Liberal paradox and the voluntary exchange of rights-exercising, A further study on rationality conditions of fuzzy choice functions, Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications, Rational fuzzy and sequential fuzzy choice, The strategy-proof social choice functions, Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness, Implementation without rationality assumptions, Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability, Topological social choice: Reply to Le Breton and Uriarte, Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence, Aggregation of preferences: a review, Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result, Some issues on consistency of fuzzy preference relations., The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory, Sequential path independence and social choice, Symmetric social choices and collective rationality, Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions, A method for aggregating ordinal assessments by a majority decision rule, Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions, Preference densities and social choices, Choice functions with states of mind, Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited, Cognitive constraints, contraction consistency, and the satisficing criterion, Impediments to universal preference-based default theories, A distance-based framework to deal with ordinal and additive inconsistencies for fuzzy reciprocal preference relations, Weakly implementable social choice rules, Transformations of discrete closure systems, Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support, Arrow's axiom and full rationality for fuzzy choice functions, Normal form backward induction for decision trees with coherent lower previsions, Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories, A refinement of prudent choices, A characterization of prudent choices, Coherent choice functions under uncertainty, Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems, Voces populi and the art of listening, Exchangeable choice functions, Binariness and rational choice, Coherent choice functions, desirability and indifference, Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization, Representations of simple games by social choice functions, Multiattribute utility theory: A survey, Reason-based choice correspondences, A dynamical model of political equilibrium, Choice probabilities and choice functions, On choosing rationally when preferences are fuzzy, Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations, Weak pseudo-rationalizability, Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives, SSB utility theory: An economic perspective, A brief history of social choice and welfare theory, Rationality, path independence, and the power structure, The structure of social decision functions, Acyclic fuzzy preferences on the Orlovsky choice function: A note, Choice functions and weak Nash axioms, Modeling rationality in a linguistic framework, A limited possibility result for social choice under majority voting, Equity- and inequity-type Borda rules, On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice, Choice functions and abstract convex geometries, Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons, Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations, Satisficing behavior with a secondary criterion, Quasitransitive rationalization and the superset property, A new index of poverty, Rational choice under fuzzy preferences: The Orlovsky choice function, A power rule for social choice, Acyclic choice and group veto, Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions, Topological aggregation of inequality preorders, Transitivity of fuzzy relations and rational choice, New problems in the general choice theory, Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case, Sequential Decision Processes under Act-State Independence with Arbitrary Choice Functions, Indeterminacy and Belief Change, Partially dominant choice, Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions, Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting, Limited attention and status quo bias, SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS IN A FUZZY ENVIRONMENT, Lexicographic Choice Functions Without Archimedeanicity, Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness, Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations, Exploring a new class of inequality measures and associated value judgements: Gini and Fibonacci-type sequences, Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences, The leveling axiom, Ethically Flexible Measures of Poverty, A New Index of Poverty, Reference Groups and the Poverty Line: An Axiomatic Approach with an Empirical Illustration, Incomplete Fermatean fuzzy preference relations and group decision-making, Common characterizations of the untrapped set and the top cycle, Decision Theory Without “Independence” or Without “Ordering”, Rationalizing two-tiered choice functions through conditional choice, Behavioral implications of shortlisting procedures, Existence of approximate social welfare, From Preference Relations to Fuzzy Choice Functions, Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice, Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators, Little and Bergson on Arrow's concept of social welfare, Some algebraic characterizations of preference structures, Maximal-element rationalizability, Collective Choice for Simple Preferences, Social Choice Theory, ON THE CONSISTENCY OF SOME CRISP CHOICE FUNCTIONS BASED ON A STRONGLY COMPLETE FUZZY PRE-ORDER, ON INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN FUZZY CONGRUENCE AXIOMS