Voces populi and the art of listening

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0442-0MaRDI QIDQ989981zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eivind Stensholt

Publication date 23 August 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163935

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• What shall we do with the cyclic profile?
• Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
• Strategic voting and nomination
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle

Cites work

• Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• Parties as Political Intermediaries
• Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Borda and Condorcet principles: Three medieval applications
• The Borda count and agenda manipulation
• Unsettling aspects of voting theory
• Vote trading in public elections

Cited in

(6)

• Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
• Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
• What shall we do with the cyclic profile?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1846716 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• Conditions for fairness anomalies in instant-runoff voting

This page was built for publication: Voces populi and the art of listening

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q989981)