Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts

DOI10.1137/S0036144501392650MaRDI QIDQ4652257zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eivind Stensholt

Publication date 25 February 2005

Published in SIAM Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/s0036144501392650

zbMATH Keywords

election systemsmonotonicitysingle transferable votes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99)

Recommendations

• A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
• The communication burden of single transferable vote, in practice
• Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules

Cited in

(5)

• The communication burden of single transferable vote, in practice
• A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification
• Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
• Analysing vote counting algorithms via logic. And its application to the CADE election scheme
• Voces populi and the art of listening

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