A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0642-2MaRDI QIDQ2452124zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Karpov, Fuad T. Aleskerov

Publication date 30 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0642-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• An impossibility theorem for electoral systems

Cited in

(8)

• Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5527898 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
• A universal voting system based on the potential method
• Toward Computing the Margin of Victory in Single Transferable Vote Elections
• On the practical possibility of a 'no show paradox' under the single transferable vote
• The communication burden of single transferable vote, in practice

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