A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0642-2zbMATH Open1288.91054OpenAlexW1985433146MaRDI QIDQ2452124FDOQ2452124

Authors: Alexander Karpov, Fuad T. Aleskerov 

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0642-2

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• An impossibility theorem for electoral systems

Cited In (7)

• Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
• A universal voting system based on the potential method
• Toward Computing the Margin of Victory in Single Transferable Vote Elections
• On the practical possibility of a 'no show paradox' under the single transferable vote

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