On the practical possibility of a 'no show paradox' under the single transferable vote
In a recent paper \textit{S. J. Brams} and \textit{P. C. Fishburn} [Math. Mag. 56, 207-214 (1983; Zbl 0521.90006)] have demonstrated that the 'single transferable vote' system for a single member electoral district admits a 'no show paradox'. The present work indicates that under the single transferable vote the probability of occurrence of a no show paradox is very high in situations where the outcome under the single transferable vote differs from that under plurality. This considerably weakens the case for replacing the plurality system by the single transferable vote system. It is also shown that under the single transferable vote the occurrence of a 'no show paradox' is consistent with one-dimensional left-right voting behaviour.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6449397
- The communication burden of single transferable vote, in practice
- An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences
- The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
- On some paradoxes in voting theory
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification
- REMARKS ON A PROCEDURAL CONDITION FOR THE VOTING PARADOX
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
- A characterization of proportionally representative committees
- Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
- Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6449397 (Why is no real title available?)
- Queen Elisabeth competition: a social choice approach
This page was built for publication: On the practical possibility of a 'no show paradox' under the single transferable vote
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1069835)
