An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0360-6zbMath1190.91047OpenAlexW1985911460WikidataQ56457255 ScholiaQ56457255MaRDI QIDQ836920

Joaquín Pérez, Estefanía García, José Luis Jimeno

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0360-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions ⋮ Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems ⋮ Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity ⋮ Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules ⋮ Welfare maximization entices participation ⋮ Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes ⋮ Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences ⋮ Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• The Manipulability of Voting Systems

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