Condorcet's principle and the preference reversal paradox
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Publication:3384086
zbMATH Open1484.91174arXiv1707.08760MaRDI QIDQ3384086FDOQ3384086
Authors: Dominik Peters
Publication date: 14 December 2021
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08760
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Cited In (9)
- Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Copeland rule and Condorcet's principle
- Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
- Can a Condorcet rule have a low coalitional manipulability
- Proxy selection in transitive proxy voting
- Welfare maximization entices participation
- Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
- Consequences of reversing preferences
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