Can a Condorcet rule have a low coalitional manipulability

DOI10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-707MaRDI QIDQ4576202zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors François Durand, Fabien Mathieu, Ludovic Noirie

Publication date 12 July 2018

zbMATH Keywords

voting ruleCondorcet rulecoalitional manipulabilityCondorcification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• Robustness against inefficient manipulation
• Condorcet's principle and the preference reversal paradox

Cited in

(3)

• Condorcet's principle and the preference reversal paradox
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting
• Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation

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