Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
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Publication:2385127
Recommendations
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
Cited in
(32)- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting
- Manipulative elicitation -- a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Obvious manipulability of voting rules
- Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules
- Strategic voting and nomination
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
- Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
- Can a Condorcet rule have a low coalitional manipulability
- Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- Strategic voting in negotiating teams
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
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