Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0216-5zbMATH Open1180.91097OpenAlexW2042939575MaRDI QIDQ2385127FDOQ2385127

Authors: Geoffrey Pritchard, Mark C. Wilson 

Publication date: 11 October 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0216-5

Recommendations

• Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule

Cited In (32)

• Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
• Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting
• Manipulative elicitation -- a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences
• Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
• The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
• Obvious manipulability of voting rules
• Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
• Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
• Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
• Statistical evaluation of voting rules
• Strategic voting and nomination
• An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
• On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
• Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
• Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
• Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
• Can a Condorcet rule have a low coalitional manipulability
• Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
• Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
• The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
• Strategic voting in negotiating teams
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules

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