Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
From MaRDI portal
Publication:314421
DOI10.1007/s10472-015-9479-1zbMath1346.91072arXiv1210.6963OpenAlexW3138275165MaRDI QIDQ314421
Rahman Lavaee, Curtis Menton, Hemaspaandra, Lane A.
Publication date: 16 September 2016
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.6963
Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (7)
Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control ⋮ Solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming ⋮ Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups ⋮ Schulze voting as evidence carrying computation ⋮ A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting ⋮ On the Computational Complexity of Variants of Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections ⋮ A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
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