Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election

DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2010.03.006zbMath1229.68045OpenAlexW2026607260MaRDI QIDQ656582

Daming Zhu, Hong Liu

Publication date: 18 January 2012

Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2010.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

controlcomputational complexityfixed parameter tractability\(W[1\)-hard]\(W[2\)-hard]Maximin election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard ⋮ Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control ⋮ The complexity of priced control in elections ⋮ Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting ⋮ Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups ⋮ The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case ⋮ Normalized range voting broadly resists control ⋮ Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems ⋮ Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey ⋮ On the Computational Complexity of Variants of Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections ⋮ Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis ⋮ A parameterized perspective on protecting elections ⋮ Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections ⋮ Combinatorial voter control in elections

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