Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-68880-8_17zbMath1143.91320MaRDI QIDQ3511426

Hemaspaandra, Lane A., Jörg Rothe, Edith Hemaspaandra, Piotr Faliszewski

Publication date: 10 July 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/4630

zbMATH Keywords

multiagent systems; preference aggregation; Computational social choice theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

91-08: Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems, Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control

Cites Work

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• Guarantees for the Success Frequency of an Algorithm for Finding Dodgson-Election Winners