Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2205MaRDI QIDQ1363527zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincent Merlin, Donald G. Saari

Publication date 28 September 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1112.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremCopeland method

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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