Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2205zbMATH Open0884.90009OpenAlexW1975380769MaRDI QIDQ1363527FDOQ1363527

Authors: Vincent Merlin, Donald G. Saari 

Publication date: 28 September 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1112.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremCopeland method

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (11)

• The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization
• Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• Ramon Llull: from `Ars electionis' to social choice theory
• Binary choice, subset choice, random utility, and ranking: a unified perspective using the permutahedron
• Rank-based choice correspondences
• Complexity and the geometry of voting
• A characterization of the Copeland solution

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