Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2205zbMATHOpenAlexMaRDI QIDQ1363527FDO

Authors Vincent Merlin, Donald G. Saari

Publication date 28 September 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1112.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremCopeland method

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Ramon Llull: from `Ars electionis' to social choice theory
• Binary choice, subset choice, random utility, and ranking: a unified perspective using the permutahedron
• Rank-based choice correspondences
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
• The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization
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• Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes

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