One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9zbMath1211.91111OpenAlexW2038238590WikidataQ56457257 ScholiaQ56457257MaRDI QIDQ532698

M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityno-show paradoxstrategy-proofnessscoring rulemanipulationparticipationCondorcet extensionone-way monotonicitysensible virtue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Proxy selection in transitive proxy voting ⋮ The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity ⋮ Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity ⋮ Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules ⋮ Welfare maximization entices participation ⋮ Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes ⋮ Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules ⋮ Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains

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