One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
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Publication:532698
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0170-9zbMATH Open1211.91111DBLPjournals/ijgt/SanverZ09OpenAlexW2038238590WikidataQ56457257 ScholiaQ56457257MaRDI QIDQ532698FDOQ532698
M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9
monotonicitymanipulationparticipationscoring rulestrategy-proofnessCondorcet extensionno-show paradoxone-way monotonicitysensible virtue
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Cited In (16)
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- Monotone strategyproofness
- The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
- Proxy selection in transitive proxy voting
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
- Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity
- Welfare maximization entices participation
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
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