One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9zbMath1211.91111OpenAlexW2038238590WikidataQ56457257 ScholiaQ56457257MaRDI QIDQ532698

M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityno-show paradoxstrategy-proofnessscoring rulemanipulationparticipationCondorcet extensionone-way monotonicitysensible virtue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

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