Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
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Publication:490062
DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9401-4zbMath1304.91076OpenAlexW2151765910WikidataQ56457256 ScholiaQ56457256MaRDI QIDQ490062
Publication date: 21 January 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9401-4
Related Items
Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions, Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems, Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving, Unnamed Item, Welfare maximization entices participation, Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
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