Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods
From the author's abstract: In voting theory, monotonicity is the axiom that an improvement in the ranking of a candidate by voters cannot cause a candidate who would otherwise win to lose. The participation axiom states that the sincere report of a voter's preferences cannot cause an outcome that the voter regards as less attractive than the one that would result from the voter's non-participation. This article identifies three binary distinctions in the types of circumstances in which failures of monotonicity or participation can occur. Two of the three distinctions apply to monotonicity, while one of those and the third apply to participation. The distinction that is unique to monotonicity is whether the voters whose changed rankings demonstrate non-monotonicity are better off or worse off. The distinction that is unique to participation is whether the marginally participating voter causes his first choice to lose or his last choice to win. The overlapping distinction is whether the profile of voters' rankings has a Condorcet winner or a cycle at the top. This article traces the occurrence of all of the resulting combination of characteristics in the voting methods that can exhibit failures of monotonicity.
- Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods
- Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate
- Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
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- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
- Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
- Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate
- Building bridges over the great divide
- Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
- The negative participation paradox in three-candidate instant runoff elections
- Single Transferable Vote and Paradoxes of Negative and Positive Involvement
- Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
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