A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2151318
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-64563-5_1zbMath1503.91057OpenAlexW4205962346MaRDI QIDQ2151318
Rachel Perez Palha, Hannu Nurmi
Publication date: 1 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64563-5_1
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods
- Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Arrovian aggregation models
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Evaluating voting systems with probability models. Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
- Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
- The paradox of multiple elections
- The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
- Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models
- Proportional Representation
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Basic Geometry of Voting
- Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain
This page was built for publication: A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
