Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules

DOI10.1016/S0166-218X(96)00100-XzbMATH Open0879.90060OpenAlexW2019142746WikidataQ127565005 ScholiaQ127565005MaRDI QIDQ1364784FDOQ1364784

Authors: Douglas R. Woodall 

Publication date: 28 August 1997

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/dam

Recommendations

• Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
• Voces populi and the art of listening
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
• Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityvoting paradoxCondorcet's principlepreferential election rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• An impossibility theorem for electoral systems

Cited In (25)

• Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts
• Voting procedures, complexity of
• What shall we do with the cyclic profile?
• Voces populi and the art of listening
• Strategic voting and nomination
• The effects on monotonicity when combining alternative vote with plurality
• Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate
• A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
• Characteristic properties of FPTP systems
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections
• The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
• Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections
• A characterization of proportionally representative committees
• Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
• Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
• Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
• Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
• Conditions for fairness anomalies in instant-runoff voting
• Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods
• Update monotone preference rules
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
• Verified construction of fair voting rules
• A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case

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