Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- An impossibility theorem for electoral systems
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
Cited in
(25)- Strategic voting and nomination
- Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- Conditions for fairness anomalies in instant-runoff voting
- The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
- Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts
- Verified construction of fair voting rules
- A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case
- Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods
- Monotonicity and Other Paradoxes in Some Proportional Representation Schemes
- Update monotone preference rules
- The effects on monotonicity when combining alternative vote with plurality
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections
- Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate
- What shall we do with the cyclic profile?
- Characteristic properties of FPTP systems
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- Voces populi and the art of listening
- A characterization of proportionally representative committees
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