A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452243
DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0663-5zbMath1288.91056arXiv0912.2195MaRDI QIDQ2452243
Rosa Camps, Laia Saumell, Xavier Mora
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0912.2195
91B12: Voting theory
Related Items
A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method, A general method for deciding about logically constrained issues, Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case
- Sensitivity Analysis in Variational Inequalities