A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0663-5zbMATH Open1288.91056arXiv0912.2195OpenAlexW1990922942MaRDI QIDQ2452243FDOQ2452243

Rosa Camps, Laia Saumell, Xavier Mora

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they need not express a comparison between every pair of options. This includes the case where each voter gives an ordered list restricted to a subset of most preferred options. In this connection, the proposed method (except for one of the given variants) carefully distinguishes a lack of information about a given pair of options from a proper tie between them. As in the special case of complete individual votes, the proposed generalization is proved to have certain desirable properties, which include: the continuity of the rates with respect to the data, a decomposition property that characterizes certain situations opposite to a tie, the Condorcet-Smith principle, and clone consistency

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0912.2195

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited In (3)

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• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• A general method for deciding about logically constrained issues

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