Social choice rules driven by propositional logic

DOI10.1007/s10472-013-9395-1zbMath1351.91015arXiv1109.4335MaRDI QIDQ2248548

Laia Saumell, Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora

Publication date: 26 June 2014

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.4335

zbMATH Keywords

transitivity; social choice theory; plurality rule; preferences; degrees of belief; approval voting; minimax rule; goodness; Condorcet principle; prominence; approval-preferential voting; choiceness; comprehensive prominence; Condorcet-Smith principle; maximin rule; refined comprehensive prominence; supremacy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

91B14: Social choice

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