Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0417-1zbMATH Open1198.91066DBLPjournals/scw/Garcia-LaprestaMM10OpenAlexW2104257901WikidataQ57086461 ScholiaQ57086461MaRDI QIDQ2268897FDOQ2268897

Authors: José Luis García-Lapresta, Miguel Martínez-Panero, A. A. J. Marley 

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Positionalist voting functions
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• An axiomatic characterization of different majority concepts
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Some probabilistic models of best, worst, and best --- worst choices
• Implementability via protective equilibria
• A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
• Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple

Cited In (11)

• Is majority consistency possible?
• Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
• Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
• Correction to: ``Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
• Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule
• Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
• What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?
• The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
• Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
• Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
• The socially acceptable scoring rule

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