Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1zbMath1198.91066OpenAlexW2104257901WikidataQ57086461 ScholiaQ57086461MaRDI QIDQ2268897

Miguel Martínez-Panero, José Luis García-Lapresta, Anthony A. J. Marley

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

The socially acceptable scoring rule ⋮ Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules ⋮ Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule ⋮ The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited ⋮ Dis\&approval voting: a characterization ⋮ Social choice rules driven by propositional logic ⋮ What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency? ⋮ Duplication in OWA-Generated Positional Aggregation Rules ⋮ Is majority consistency possible?

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