Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
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Recommendations
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- A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives
- Truthful approximations to range voting
- Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5135703 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3366923 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3395595 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A Theorem on Utilitarianism
- A general scoring rule
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
- Formal utilitarianism and range voting
- Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Ranking by rating
- Ranking committees, income streams or multisets
- Relative Utilitarianism
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- The threshold aggregation
- Variable-population voting rules
Cited in
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