Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
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Publication:1633653
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.09.002zbMath1418.91198OpenAlexW2786451604MaRDI QIDQ1633653
Publication date: 20 December 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01222200/file/Voting%20with%20evaluations.pdf
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On reaching social consent, Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting, An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
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