Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.09.002zbMATH Open1418.91198OpenAlexW2786451604WikidataQ129247474 ScholiaQ129247474MaRDI QIDQ1633653FDOQ1633653

Authors: Antonin Macé 

Publication date: 20 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01222200/file/Voting%20with%20evaluations.pdf

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• A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure

zbMATH Keywords

measurementutilitarianismrange votingevaluative voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (5)

• On reaching social consent
• Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
• Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
• An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation

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