Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
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Publication:483524
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0766-7zbMath1302.91073OpenAlexW1994510132WikidataQ56565767 ScholiaQ56565767MaRDI QIDQ483524
Annick Laruelle, José Carlos Rodríguez Alcantud
Publication date: 17 December 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10366/127275
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