Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3641150 (Why is no real title available?)
- A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings
- A general scoring rule
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
- An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
- Axiomatizations of approval voting
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
Cited in
(24)- Social Choice Theory
- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
- Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting
- Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
- Characterizing approval voting
- Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule
- The wisdom of collective grading and the effects of epistemic and semantic diversity
- Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
- Centroid transformations of intuitionistic fuzzy values based on aggregation operators
- Formal utilitarianism and range voting
- Hybrid decision-making frameworks under complex spherical fuzzy \(N\)-soft sets
- Complex picture fuzzy \(N\)-soft sets and their decision-making algorithm
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- New decision-making hybrid model: intuitionistic fuzzy \(N\)-soft rough sets
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Voting systems that combine approval and preference
- Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
- Qualified voting systems
- Preference aggregation in the generalised unavailable candidate model
- The socially acceptable scoring rule
- \(N\)-soft sets and their decision making algorithms
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
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