Evaluationwise strategy-proofness

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.010MaRDI QIDQ1682726zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bora Erdamar, M. Remzi Sanver, Shin Sato

Publication date 5 December 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystrategy-proofnessapproval votingevaluationwise strategy-proofnesspreference-approval

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings
• A general scoring rule
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• An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
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• Approval voting
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• Axiomatizations of approval voting
• Circular domains
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
• Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
• Further results on dictatorial domains
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
• Handbook on approval voting
• Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
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• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Social threshold aggregations
• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
• Voting by Committees
• Voting systems that combine approval and preference

Cited in

(4)

• Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
• Evaluation and strategic manipulation

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