Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
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Publication:2341124
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Cites work
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Axiomatizations of approval voting
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Characterizing approval voting
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
- Social choice and individual values
- The basic approval voting game
- Twitching weak dictators
- Weak independence and veto power.
Cited in
(15)- Philippe Mongin 1950--2020
- Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences
- Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Philippe Mongin (1950-2020)
- Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
- Majority-approval social choice
- The informational basis of scoring rules
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking
- Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
- Characterizations of approval ranking
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