Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
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Publication:2341124
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0847-2zbMath1318.91067OpenAlexW2144068926MaRDI QIDQ2341124
François Maniquet, Philippe Mongin
Publication date: 23 April 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0847-2
Related Items
Philippe Mongin 1950--2020, Majority-approval social choice, The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking, Evaluationwise strategy-proofness, Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures, The informational basis of scoring rules, The strategic sincerity of approval voting, Philippe Mongin (1950-2020), Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences, Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach
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