Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0847-2zbMATH Open1318.91067OpenAlexW2144068926MaRDI QIDQ2341124FDOQ2341124

Authors: François Maniquet, Philippe Mongin 

Publication date: 23 April 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0847-2

Recommendations

• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
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• Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences
• Approval voting without ballot restrictions
• An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Twitching weak dictators
• Weak independence and veto power.
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• A simple characterization of approval voting
• Characterizing approval voting
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Axiomatizations of approval voting
• A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives
• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
• The basic approval voting game

Cited In (15)

• Philippe Mongin 1950--2020
• Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences
• Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
• Philippe Mongin (1950-2020)
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Majority-approval social choice
• The informational basis of scoring rules
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking
• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
• Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
• Characterizations of approval ranking

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