Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3641150 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A simple characterization of majority rule
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
- Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Social choice and individual values
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- Voting by Committees
- Voting operators in the space of choice functions
Cited in
(25)- Rationalizations of Voting Rules
- Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
- Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model
- Simple majority voting isn't special
- Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
- Rationalizable voting
- Voting in one's head as a source of nearly transitive individual preferences over multi-dimensional issues
- Preference exclusions for social rationality
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6258504 (Why is no real title available?)
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Characterizations of approval ranking
- Special majority rules. Necessary and sufficient condition for quasi- transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences
- Collective transitivity in majorities based on difference in support
- Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Majority cycles in a multi-dimensional setting
- Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups
- Rational voters in a partisanship model
- Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
- ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4128624 (Why is no real title available?)
- Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
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