Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
This paper discusses transitivity of social preference relations and weaker versions of it. Two kinds of restricted domains of individual preferences are considered. The first is characterized by all preferences having at most two indifference classes. The other is characterized by any set of three alternatives being partitioned into two non-empty subsets such that alternatives in one set are strictly preferred to alternatives in the other set. It is proved that, for fixed such domains, among the voting rules satisfying monotonicity, anonymity and neutrality, majority voting is the unique satisfying transitivity, although other voting rules satisfy acyclicity.
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- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
- Rationalizable voting
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- Voting by Committees
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- Rational voters in a partisanship model
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- Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model
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- Rationalizable voting
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- Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
- Rationalizations of Voting Rules
- ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
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- Preference exclusions for social rationality
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
- Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
- Characterizations of approval ranking
- Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences
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