Simple majority voting isn't special

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90086-6MaRDI QIDQ1059535zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 1984

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90086-6

zbMATH Keywords

maximal alternative existenceprobability of strategyproofnessSimple majority voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

Simple majority voting is compared with several other representative voting systems with respect to the frequency with which various anomalies occur. Whether strong or weak preferences are used, for each anomaly type simple majority voting yields neither highest nor lowest frequencies.

Recommendations

• Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple
• Is the preference of the majority representative?
• A new characterization of simple majority
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

Cites work

• Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
• Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures
• Condorcet's paradox
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives

Cited in

(2)

• One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions
• Reasonable elections don’t exist!

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