How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
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Publication:2247941
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Cites work
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Condorcet’s Paradox
- From individual to collective ordering through multidimensional attribute space
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- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
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Cited in
(25)- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Simple majority voting isn't special
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
- Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice
- A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda compromise
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
- Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
- The expressive power of voting rules
- Smoothed analysis of social choice revisited
- Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections
- Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation
- Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
- Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates
- Condorcet efficiency: weighted Bucklin vs. weighted scoring and Borda
- Can ranked-choice voting elect the least popular candidate?
- Instant runoff voting and the reinforcement paradox
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