How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0720-8zbMath1291.91067WikidataQ57340971 ScholiaQ57340971MaRDI QIDQ2247941

Florenz Plassmann, T. Nicolaus Tideman

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0720-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

62P20: Applications of statistics to economics

91B12: Voting theory

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