scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4128624
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0669.00029.] \textit{K. J. Arrow} [``Social choice and individual values (New York 1951)], \textit{D. Black} [J. Polit. Econ. 56, 23-34 (1948); ``The theory of committees and elections (1958; Zbl 0091.157)], \textit{P. C. Fishburn} [``The theory of social choice (1973; Zbl 0253.92006)], \textit{K. Inada} [Econometrica 32, 525-531 (1964); ibid. 37, 490-506 (1969; Zbl 0188.243)], \textit{A. K. Sen} [ibid. 34, 491-499 (1966; Zbl 0149.170)], and \textit{A. K. Sen} and \textit{P. K. Pattanaik} [J. Econ. Theory 1, 178-202 (1969)], among others, proposed sufficient as well as necessary and sufficient domain conditions such that the rule of simple majority decision generates transitive social preferences. All these conditions were exclusion conditions; in other words, certain individual orderings were not allowed to be held by any member of society. The present approach is quite different. Starting from the concept of preference proximity we formulate a domain condition which proves to be necessary and sufficient for transitivity of the social relation under the majority rule. This ``property of binary inversion (BIP) is applied in the following way: Take any preference profile \(\pi\) of a society, transform it into another profile \(\pi^*\), the reduced equivalent strict preference profile, and check whether the remaining set of individual orderings is such that a path exists linking all types of orderings by binary inversions of adjacent alternatives. If and only if this property holds, we can be sure that the social relation is fully transitive. This result holds independent of additional distributional requirements whatsoever. The main difference to the traditional domain restrictions is that our condition focusses on artificially constructed societies. It seems to us that for the issue of social transitivity under the method of simple majority decision, it is worthwhile to focus on reduced profiles and not on the - much more complex - original ones.
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- Finding sharper distinctions for conditions of transitivity of the majority method.
- General concepts of value restriction and preference majority
- How Large are Transitive Simple Majority Domains?
- Preference exclusions for social rationality
- A necessary and sufficient single-profile condition for transitivity of the majority rule relation
- Single profile of preferences with variable societies: a characterization of simple majority rule
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