Majority cycles in a multi-dimensional setting

DOI10.1007/S001990100205MaRDI QIDQ1865219zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Laurent Vidu

Publication date 25 March 2003

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100205

zbMATH Keywords

logrollingMcGarvey's theoremvote tradingmajority cyclesmulti-dimensional voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
• What majority decisions are possible
• Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• The existence of a majority rule maximal set in arbitrary \(n\)-dimensional spatial models

Cited in

(8)

• Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
• A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking
• Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model
• The existence of a majority rule maximal set in arbitrary \(n\)-dimensional spatial models
• A conflict analysis approach for illuminating distributional issues in sustainability policy
• Compromise in combinatorial vote
• When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule

This page was built for publication: Majority cycles in a multi-dimensional setting

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1865219)