Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0584-8zbMATH Open1235.91054OpenAlexW2116249082MaRDI QIDQ649159FDOQ649159

Salvador Barberà, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 30 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0584-8

Recommendations

• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• Majority voting on restricted domains
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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Single-peaked orders on a tree
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• Domain conditions in social choice theory
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• Characterization of Transitive Individual Preferences for Quasi-Transitive Collective Preference under Simple Games

Cited In (8)

• Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
• Finding sharper distinctions for conditions of transitivity of the majority method.
• Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
• Majority cycles in a multi-dimensional setting
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
• Majority-consistent preference orderings
• Special majority rules. Necessary and sufficient condition for quasi- transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences

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