Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
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Publication:649159
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Cites work
- Characterization of Transitive Individual Preferences for Quasi-Transitive Collective Preference under Simple Games
- Domain conditions in social choice theory
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
Cited in
(12)- Special majority rules. Necessary and sufficient condition for quasi- transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences
- Finding sharper distinctions for conditions of transitivity of the majority method.
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Majority cycles in a multi-dimensional setting
- Majority-consistent preference orderings
- Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
- Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- Majority decisions when abstention is possible
- Majority voting on restricted domains
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