Special majority rules. Necessary and sufficient condition for quasi- transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences
Consider a social choice problem with a finite number of alternatives and at least three voters. Suppose that each voter's preference ordering is quasitransitive. Let P be the social prefererence ordering induced by special majorities (strictly greater than 1/2). The main result of the paper is a necessary and sufficient condition for P to be quasitransitive. The condition is a generalization of the familiar condition that there be no Condorcet cycle among three voters.
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- A necessary and sufficient single-profile condition for transitivity of the majority rule relation
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