On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A characterization for qualified majority voting rules
- A new characterization of simple majority
- A new characterization of the majority rule
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- Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
- Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
- Majority Voting and Social Choice
- Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
- Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority
- More on the majority rule: profiles, societies, and responsiveness
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity
- Single profile of preferences with variable societies: a characterization of simple majority rule
- Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules
- Special majority rules. Necessary and sufficient condition for quasi- transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences
- The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
- The majority rule with a chairman
Cited in
(8)- Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
- Beyond neutrality: extended difference of votes rules
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
- A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems
- Qualified voting systems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6536491 (Why is no real title available?)
- Classification aggregation without unanimity
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