Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.12.036MaRDI QIDQ2444348zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philippe De Donder

Publication date 9 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15542/1/dedonder_15542.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

anchorsmedian voterSpence-Mirrlees conditionunidimensional policy space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Majority rule in multi-dimensional spatial models
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
• Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations
• Condorcet winners on median spaces

Cited in

(3)

• The political choice of social long term care transfers when family gives time and money
• Single-crossing choice correspondences
• Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks

This page was built for publication: Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2444348)