Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
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Cites work
Cited in
(20)- Local operators in models of social choice
- Hierarchical voting
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- New problems in the general choice theory
- Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Limits of acyclic voting
- Consensus functions on tree quasi-orders that satisfy an independence condition
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- A Borda count for partially ordered ballots
- Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
- The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
- The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
- Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
- Semisimple games, enactment power and generalized power indices
- Voting operators in the space of choice functions
- Conditions on social-preference cycles
- Product filters, acyclicity and suzumura consistency
- Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions
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