Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(87)90019-XzbMath0632.90005MaRDI QIDQ1095771

Jeff Strnad

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90019-x

zbMATH Keywords

strong Nash equilibrium; full Nash implementation; neutral social functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

A note on the `surjectivity property', Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions

Cites Work

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